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This paper examines the impact of tax competition on the commodfication of 
ideas, and points towards a particular set of negative consequences that 
affect the developing world.  As multinational business becomes increasingly 
independent of national borders, the power relationship between business 
and government has shifted from one in which governments imposed tax on 
business in return for the privilege of operating within its jurisdiction, to one in 
which governments distort their tax system to suit business, in the hope of 
enticing them to locate on their shores. The race to the bottom in terms of tax 
rates has been well-chronicled in studies such as Christensen et al (2004), 
and Murphy (2006) 
 
Countries which were successful at the first round of tax competition are now 
finding that tax rates alone will not hold the multinationals on which they have 
become so dependent. The economic growth associated with their earlier 
success has brought high operating and wage costs. Multinationals who have 
remained lightly rooted in the soil of these countries can easily move their 
manufacturing to cheaper, emerging economies, taking with them their 
coveted jobs and exports. In order to retain them, these first round winning 
countries are now encouraging multinationals to locate their research and 
development as well as their production facilities with them. They hope that 
this is a less mobile activity, less easily replicated in a developing country, and 
so will anchor the multinational firmly in their territory. 
 
In this new level of the tax competition game, incentives are given not only for 
gross production, but for the production of knowledge. As a consequence, 
knowledge itself becomes commodified, and intellectual capital widely defined 
and privatised. This means that ideas previously shared must now be bought, 
and products previously sold at a price determined by the local market may 
now only be sold if the market can support their original, patent-protected 
form. 
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This paper tracks the development from the old to the new rules of tax 
competition, using the example of Ireland to illustrate the strategies adopted 
at each stage. The rational, self-serving response of multinationals is 
explored, and the immediate downstream effects for developing countries 
discussed.  The writings of Michel Foucault are used to gain perspective on 
the idea of intellectual capital. Finally, the sustainability of the new form of tax 
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Nations have traditionally used their tax systems as a means of exerting 
power, as well as a means of raising revenue. Power, for Foucault, relies 
upon surveillance and the ability to discipline. However, this ability to govern 
business through the taxation system faces challenges. Nationally-centred tax 
systems are increasingly ineffective at governing very mobile capital. As 
multinational firms become more dominant, countries compete to host their 
facilities. The taxation system ceases to be a means of governing companies, 
and becomes the lure used to attract them to locate production facilities in a 
particular country. Power correspondingly shifts from the state to the 
multinational firm. This process by which firms vie for the attentions of 
multinational firms using their tax systems as bait is known as tax competition.  
 
In the past, tax competition has involved the relatively simple strategy of 
having low tax rates or narrow tax bases, to reduce the cost to business of 
operating in a competing country. As more countries enter the game, this is 
unsustainable in the medium term, and as described below, the new round of 
tax competition centres instead on the creation of intellectual property.  
Intellectual property rights have long been accepted as a hazard to countries 
in the South, and most research in the area explores how they have 
developed based on international agreements such as TRIPS. This paper 
makes the connection with tax competition, and describes how self-interested 
actions by developed countries engaging in the new round of tax competition 
have unforeseen and damaging impact on developing countries 
 
Foucault had little to say on taxation itself but his work on the state, practices 
of bureaucracies, surveillance, self governance and power is highly relevant 
to this area of research. Foucault’s concentration on practices or technologies 
have tended to place phenomena such as accounting and tax practice at the 
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centre of any analysis of wider social issues. Both the realist and the 
Gramscian school suggest that power centres can impose a set of certain 
practices on the world. The flow of ideas corresponds to the contours of 
power in the world and in a given society. The distinction here would be that 
while the realist school would tend to focus on the power relations, Gramscian 
theory accepts the importance of relative power but adds emphasis to 
ideological hegemony. Foucauldian thought, whilst accepting the salience of 
the above, would seek to examine the impact of practices themselves.  In the 
area of TRIPS for example, the US was eventually successful in introducing a 
more strident regime in the area of TRIPS enforcement. For the realist school, 
given the dominance of the US globally this was the expected outcome. 
Gramscian theorists would tend to focus on the power of the ideas inherent in 
TRIPS and on their ability to convince. Foucauldian theory would also 
highlight the type of thinking that fed into negotiating process and the manner 
in which certain practices are rendered somehow natural, and in becoming 
such, take on a power of their own.  If this prism is applied to the fact that 
most patents reside in the northern hemisphere, and royalties are charged to 
the south, both Realists  and Gramscian theorists would see this as an 
inevitable outcome of a world power imbalance,  Foucauldian analysis would 
examine the way in which intellectual property is built up in individual nation 
states, and the differing reported motivations of the multinational firms and the 
countries which host them. Whilst accepting the impact of asymmetrical power 
relations, such an analysis would examine the role played by language 
surrounding the practice and the manner in which practice itself gains prestige 
and ultimately power. This paper takes the latter approach, using insights 
from a reading of Foucault to illuminate the idea of intellectual property and so 
to critique its use as a strategy for tax competition.  
 
Ireland has been chosen to illustrate the strategies for a number of reasons. 
The first is that Ireland is undeniably very successful as a tax competitor, 
having built a booming economy around foreign direct investment, largely 
attracted by the tax regime. The tactics adopted by Ireland have, by definition, 
been effective, and are therefore likely to be followed by other competing 
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nations. Secondly, Ireland has little by way of natural resources or 
geographical advantages, which simplifies the task of isolating the reasons for 
multinationals to locate there. Finally, since the overwhelming bulk of Ireland’s 
foreign direct investment comes from one source – the US – it is relatively 
straightforward to see the patterns in the movement of the multinational firms.  
 
This paper is set out as follows: the next section briefly reviews the idea of tax 
competition, and the traditional strategies employed by countries, followed by 
the newer tactics centring on intellectual capital. Ireland is used as an 
illustration in both cases. The predictable responses of self-interested 
multinationals are then outlined, and the consequences for global flows of 
capital described. Next, Foucault’s writings on the nature of the author are 
used to illuminate and critique the concept of intellectual capital motivated by 
the new tax competition rules. In conclusion, some hazards are identified for 
developing countries, and tentative lessons drawn from the Irish experience.  
Traditional strategies in tax competition 
 
Tax competition may be loosely defined as the process by which nations 
compete to persuade multinational companies to locate within their borders, 
using their tax systems as the primary means to gain advantage over other 
competing countries1. The main motivation for corporate internationalism is 
cost reduction in one form or another. Business is most profitable where costs 
are low, so low wages, operating costs and taxes make for an attractive 
operating environment.  Sikka et al (2005) describe how large firms “roam the 
world” in search of attractive locations, in the process acquiring more power 
than the governments that host them. Multinational companies have grown to 
such an extent that Clarke (1999) noted that 52 of the top 100 economies in 
the world in 1999 were corporations rather than companies. Mitchell (2002) 
describes this shifting of influence from countries to corporations as “the quiet 
retreat of sovereign power”. 
 
                                            
1 See TJN (2006) for a more complete definition of tax competition 
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Traditionally, countries seeking to attract such firms have tried to produce the 
low-cost environment they favour by moderating wage demands, subsidising 
infrastructure, and/or maintaining low taxes. Of the three, taxes are the 
easiest to manipulate. Research on the response of firms to changing tax 
rates has produced mixed results, mainly due to the difficulty in isolating tax 
variables, externally establishing a firm’s undisclosed tax position, or 
establishing the precise motivation for actions that may have been taken in 
response to tax incentives . Nevertheless studies as far back as Valles (1985) 
have produced evidence of tax-motivated relocations by US firms. Clearly tax 
is not the only factor that triggers a relocation or location decision, but studies 
from Norregaard and Owens (1992) to Devereux et al (2002) consistently 
show that while many factors need to be considered, the tax rate remains a 
critical element in the decision to locate in a particular jurisdiction.   
 
The practice of tax rate competition has become so widespread as to cause 
concern beyond NGOs, in the international community, leading to guidelines 
being issued by the EU on tax competition in 1997, and the establishment by 
the OECD in 1998 of a project on harmful tax competition. As outlined in 
OECD (1998) a country will be designated by the OECD as a tax haven 
provided it lacks transparency or exchange of information and offers a very 
low rate of tax which is either available with little or no real economic activity, 
or is restricted to particular classes of companies. The latter condition aims to 
deter the practice of offering a low tax rate only to targeted inward investment, 
while charging a higher one to local business. This, if permitted, would allow a 
government to preserve the revenue stream from their own domestic firms 
while poaching tax from their neighbours. A low rate is therefore a necessary, 
but not sufficient condition for a tax haven. 
 
The “race to the bottom” in terms of tax rates is unsustainable as a long-term 
single strategy, and is a dangerous tactic for countries wishing to attract 
multinationals. Where the tax rate alone is used to attract investment, the 
logical response of multinationals is to locate high-profit, highly-mobile 
activities within the target jurisdiction. In general these are low-skill activities, 
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such as manufacturing, which can be easily moved to a new location if tax 
rates rise, or if a more attractive proposition presents itself. A country which 
has cut its tax rates and secured some inward investment may at any time 
may be undercut by a new location, and lose the investment after a relatively 
short period.  Avi Yonah (2001) notes that 
 
..taxes do in fact play a crucial role in determining investment location 
decisions …. [but] … given the need for tax revenues, developing 
countries would in general prefer to refrain from granting tax incentives, 
if only they could be assured that no other developing country would be 
able to grant such incentives  (Avi-Yonah 2001:8). 
 
However, while the local rate of tax is critical to the decision to establish a 
subsidiary or branch, it is not the only tax factor. Given the complexity of 
multinational structures, large international firms try to ensure that profits not 
only escape taxation in the host country in which they have been generated, 
but can also be repatriated to the home country with minimal tax. Studies find 
that multinational firms are attracted not only by the rate, but also by the 
presence of a tax treaty between the home and host countries. For example, 
Hines (1998) found that Japanese firms establishing subsidiaries overseas 
were more likely to invest in countries where a Japanese tax credit was 
granted for the overseas tax paid. This has led those countries competing 
successfully for foreign direct investment to put effort into developing and 
maintaining their network of international tax treaties, as well as offering a low 
rate of tax.  
 
International tax treaties are negotiated independently by the countries 
concerned but are based on a standard template. This incorporates elements 
from the OECD model, or less commonly, the UN model, the latter being 
generally considered to be more favourable for developing countries. This 
represents a departure from the state as an organic, indivisible entity, as the 
inter-relationship between them becomes critical to their ability to attract 
capital. Tax treaties have traditionally been negotiated on a bilateral basis 
between countries, although more recently multi-lateral treaties have been 
negotiated covering whole regions. They govern such issues as the primary 
and secondary taxing rights on income generated in one country by a firm 
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resident in a second, or of the remittance of dividends, royalties or interest 
from one country to another. For example, if a US-based multinational group 
establishes a manufacturing plant in Ireland, article XX of the Ireland-US 
double tax treaty determines that Ireland has primary taxing rights on the 
profits of the subsidiary. When these are remitted to the US, the treaty 
stipulates that tax may be withheld by Ireland on dividend payments, and that 
the US government will allow a credit for this Irish tax paid against the US 
liability. Similar articles govern the taxation of interest or royalties paid from 
one country to another, the taxation of salaries earned in one jurisdiction and 
paid in another, etc. Davies (2003) notes that in 1997, there were over 2,000 
such bilateral treaties in operation worldwide, covering most aspects of 
foreign direct investment.  
 
Without treaties, the benefits that accrue to a multinational firm operating in a 
low-tax host country are eroded when profits are repatriated. Conversely, with 
an extensive network of treaties, a country with very low tax rates can attempt 
to hold multinationals for a longer period, including the phase in which the 
subsidiary is remitting profits back to the home country. Consequently the 
maintenance of treaties is seen as critical to the long-term success of any low-
tax jurisdiction.  However, if a country is designated as a tax haven by the 
OECD, this will significantly damage the tax treaty network, and make it far 
more difficult for the multinational firms operating within its borders to 
repatriate profits. The designation of tax treaty is therefore one which all tax 
competing countries seek to avoid.  
The case of Ireland 
Ireland is a useful illustration of these points. It is a small island on the 
periphery of Europe, with few natural resources. Colonisation by Britain 
effectively wiped out the infant industries present in the 1800s, and by 
independence in the early 20th Century, there was no real entrepreneurial 
class. From the 1930s protected national industry failed to produce economic 
growth, and in the 1960s, unemployment and emigration were accepted as 
part of Irish life. At this point, the policy reversed engines, abandoned 
Accountancy Business and the Public Interest, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2008 
 
 79
protections and began to actively seek foreign investment in export-oriented 
business.  
 
As set out in Killian (2006), initially, this was done through export sales relief, 
which zero-rated profit on goods exported from the country. At the time, 
indigenous firms which had operated within a protectionist regime were small 
and inward looking, and in general did not benefit. Multinational firms looking 
to establish a base in Europe were attracted by the zero rate, and  became 
the main beneficiaries of it.  When Export Sales Relief ran out in 1980, it was 
followed the introduction of manufacturing relief, which afforded a low 10% 
rate of tax to profit on goods manufactured in the state. Critically, the definition 
of “manufacture” was left to case law rather than legislation, and over time 
developed to include any irreversible process resulting in a commercially 
different product. This came to include assembly of computer parts, the 
cloning of plants, the ripening of bananas and the grading of coal. When the 
low rate on offer to manufacturing companies came under attack from the EU 
and under threat from the OECD, it was raised slightly and extended to all 
companies resident within the state. The application of the low rate to all 
sectors, not just manufacturing, enabled the country to sidestep the 
accusation of ring-fencing the low rate to foreign firms, and so to avoid being 
tagged a tax haven. Currently the corporation tax rate in Ireland is just 12.5%, 
but unusually the country maintains a network of forty-three favourable double 
tax treaties with eight more under negotiation.  Hanley (2006) quotes the 
American Chamber of Commerce Ireland as follows 
 
The reason people come to Ireland is because of our tax treaty network 
on top of the 12.5% rate. Tax treaties do not have tax treaties (Hanly 
(2006:4). 
 
As a direct result of this strategy, Ireland has become the number one 
exporter of software in the world, with full employment, net immigration, and a 
booming economy derived almost exclusively from foreign direct investment, 
mainly from US firms drawn in by the low tax rates. While the corporation tax 
rate is low, the overall tax take has increased, mainly due to Value Added Tax 
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(VAT), a form of sales tax not  ultimately borne by exporting multinational 
firms, and so, socially regressive in nature. Inequality has grown in tandem 
with wealth in Ireland, with a relatively small group reaping the benefits of 
inward investment, and those at the margins of society, mainly the elderly, 
ethnic minorities and ill, remaining outside of the boom (NESC 2005). The 
National Economic Social Council 2006 Strategy Report notes that “there is 
also a risk of deepening dualism in Ireland’s welfare state, which should be 
avoided.” (Nesc 2006) While supporting exports and competitiveness, the  
report goes on to say that the solution lies in 
 
Escaping from the idea … that Irish prosperity is virtually all created in 
the exporting, mostly foreign-owned enterprises, with the rest of 
economic activity merely a recycling of that value                           
(NESC 2006:2) 
 
Killian (2006) observes that the people most vulnerable in modern Ireland are 
those outside the reach of employment; that in effect, Ireland has out-sourced 
some of its social contract with its citizens to the multinationals, with all of the 
short term benefits and long term hazards that outsourcing brings.  
 
The large firms located in Ireland have become pivotal to the communities in 
which they operate: generating employment, supporting service industries and 
schools, contributing to community initiatives and drawing in a new population 
from EU accession states. This boosts the local economy, and property 
prices, and creates an asymmetrical dependence which is sometimes 
exploited by the multinational firm in its negotiations with the Irish 
government2.  
 
Ireland has become prosperous. Wages have increased, and the new 
affluence has led to rising prices. Its success as a tax competitor carried 
within it the seed of its own undoing. Despite the low tax rates, Ireland is now 
an expensive country. As noted by Christensen et al (2004), tax is viewed by 
multinational firms as just one of the costs to minimise. Now that Ireland is a 
                                            
2 See Killian (2006) for a more complete discussion of the power imbalance between 
multinational firms and the Irish government 
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high-wage economy, it has begun to lose low-value manufacturing jobs to 
Eastern Europe and Morocco. Its response takes it to the next level in the 
game of tax competition – targeting intellectual property.  
Ireland’s new game: IP and tax 
Since Ireland has found that competing successfully on tax rates no longer 
provides the low-cost environment in which manufacturing multinationals like 
to operate, the government is seeking to embed the multinationals by 
encouraging them to locate their R&D facilities in Ireland. The logic is that 
while manufacturing jobs are easily shifted to low wage or low tax locations, 
research jobs enhance the value of individual Irish workers, and make them 
more difficult for the multinationals to replace. In this way, they root the 
multinationals within Ireland for a longer period, despite the increased costs of 
operating here. The relevant government minister is Micheál Martin, and he is 
quoted in Madden (2006) as follows: 
 
“That’s the key strategy – to improve our capacity on research and 
development and innovation ….. It’s a critical area. If you’re bringing in 
investments of that kind, you’re copper-fastening the company’s 
contribution to Ireland for another 20-odd years.”                          
(Madden 2006:12) 
 
Miscellaneous incentives offered by Ireland include a tax deduction for know-
how on setting up a trade, no rules on transfer pricing, and a stamp duty 
exemption in transfers of intellectual property. However the two main planks in 
the strategy are a specific tax credit for research and development (R&D) 
Expenditure, and a patent income exemption.  
 
In 2004, the annual Finance Act introduced a new 20% tax credit for qualifying 
expenditure on R&D by companies subject to Irish tax. The aim was squarely 
to root investment by multinational firms. The government had, in the words of 
the then government Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment, “placed 
Research and Development at the heart of our economic development 
strategy.” (Harney, 2004) 
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The Irish Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment  have published 
regulations  setting out what activities or expenses qualify for the R&D tax 
credit. The list is broad and inclusive, and would cover, for example, most 
activities in chemistry, medicine or pharmacy except market research, quality 
control, legal and administrative work. Where a firm’s qualifying R&D 
expenditure is increasing, the company’s Irish tax liability can be reduced by 
20% of the increment since 2003. In December 2006, this was extended for a 
further three year period. Given that the tax rate in Ireland is currently 12.5%, 
this is a generous measure, effectively allowing a 160% tax deduction for 
qualifying expenditure. It is clearly therefore to the advantage of all companies 
paying tax in Ireland to designate as much of their costs as possible as R&D 
expense. The regulations ensure that this can be done with relative ease.  
 
The second “anchoring” strategy of the Irish government is a complete 
exemption from income tax for patent income where the associated R&D work 
has taken place in Ireland. This is currently the subject of a challenge at EU 
level, on the basis that it is incompatible with the freedom of establishment 
and the free movement of services within the EU. From the Irish government 
point of view, however, the exemption as originally enacted is the logical foil to 
the R&D tax credit. If companies locate their R&D activities in an Irish 
subsidiary, this will lead to a build-up of intellectual property there. Patent 
royalties can then be paid into the Irish firm by licensed manufacturers and by 
other plants in the group using the technology. The patent income exemption 
reduces the Irish tax on this stream of patent royalties to 0%. Furthermore, 
dividends paid by the Irish company from this qualifying patent income are to 
be completely disregarded for Irish tax purposes. This means that no income 
tax is payable on their receipt by, for example, Irish resident executives, and 
no withholding tax is imposed by the Irish firm where these dividends are paid 
to other jurisdictions.  
“Unenlightened self-interest”  - the response of MNCs 
 
When multinationals respond to these incentives with what Christensen 
(2003) described as unenlightened self-interest, the consequences are 
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predictable. Where the conditions are satisfied, R&D activity carried on in 
Ireland will effectively shelter other profits in the firm through the windfall R&D 
tax credit. The resulting product can be patented, and manufacturing plants 
can be established in, say, a low-cost developing country. Profit arising in this 
country can be moved to Ireland in the form of a patent royalty. Since, as 
previously noted, royalties are generally paid free of any withholding tax under 
the OECD model double tax treaty, this means that payment is free from any 
withholding tax in the developing country. Neither is it taxed in Ireland under 
the patent income exemption. The proceeds can then be repatriated to the 
home country of the multinational free from any Irish withholding tax. Thus the 
entire web of double tax treaties can be navigated to enable profits to be 
remitted to the home country, through Ireland, from any manufacturing 
location with which Ireland has a standard double tax treaty. This royalty 
pipeline will operate as long as the expenditure in Ireland is classified as R&D, 
and the income received from the manufacturing plant is classified as a 
royalty.  
 
The effect is that multinational firms will locate their R&D divisions in countries 
such as Ireland, mainly in the Northern hemisphere, and their manufacturing 
facilities in low-cost, developing countries, mainly in the South. Chui et al 
(2001:334) noted the beginning of a new pattern of production, whereby 
goods formerly produced in the North are now increasingly manufactured in 
the South. Patent income will then flow from South to North. Because these 
patent royalties are paid within the group, and probably not outside of it, the 
transfer pricing will be relatively opaque, with no external benchmark with 
which taxing authorities can challenge the rate paid.  
 
Three facets of the tax system, the standard OECD tax treaty, the R&D tax 
credit and the patent income exemption therefore combine to entice 
multinationals to designate as much of their activity as possible as the 
creation and exploitation of intellectual property, rather than the simple sale of 
goods.. As shown above, these aspects of the international tax system also 
combine to ensure that the economic relationship between actors from the 
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South to the North is couched in terms of intellectual property rights, rather 
than trade. Products developed under this model will appear costly because 
so much expense has been directly attributed to their development. The 
pricing of these products can then be made relatively immutable, even when 
the market clearly demands a discount. It is far easier to defend a high price 
on, say, medicines sold to developing countries when it is linked to the 
sacrosanct  idea that intellectual property must earn a rent.  
 
This has consequences unintended by the original policy-makers in the 
competing countries. A good, if extreme, example is the sale of anti-retroviral 
medicines. Most agencies active in the field of HIV Aids, such as the Aids 
Foundation of South Africa, agree that the roll-out of anti-retrovirals by the 
South African government in 2003 is the single most significant recent step 
towards alleviating the pandemic. However, such anti-retrovirals were for 
many years unaffordable in sub-Saharan Africa. The high price at which they 
were sold there reflected in part the need to recoup the investment made in 
the patent (Jensen, 2000). This investment, and consequently the price 
demanded for the goods sold, is inflated by the tax rules outlined above.  
 
A knock-on effect is that if R&D costs cannot be recouped on products 
designed for people in poorer nations, the R&D effort of private firms will be 
concentrated on products which can be profitably be sold in developed 
countries, on obesity drugs, for example, rather than malaria medication. At 
the same time, intellectual property rights as protected by the TRIPS 
agreement prevent the process of “learning by copying”, and the ultimate 
production of generic drugs by local companies, even where they have the 
technological know-how. As noted by Oxfam (2001), this exacerbates the 
technological divide in all areas protected by intellectual property rights.  
 
The ideological underpinnings of the process are unclear. Competing states 
such as Ireland set out to achieve a defined objective – the anchoring of 
inward investment, and the discouragement of the flight of capital. However, 
the measures they take to achieve these aims inadvertently contribute to an 
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uncompromising pricing policy on the goods or processes designed there, and 
a protection of the process, preventing imitation. This in turn impoverishes the 
South in ways that would not have been predicted. There is, however, no sign 
of concern in Ireland’s Industrial Development Authority about the impact of 
Ireland’s tax competition on less successful countries. Staunton (2006) quotes 
the head of their Manhattan office as follows: “All we want is more than our 
fair share”. 
 
What is clear is that the system suits the multinational firms at every turn. As 
long as their activities are couched in terms of intellectual property rather than 
the simple production of saleable goods, their taxes are minimised, their 
transfer pricing is rendered opaque, their high selling prices are facilitated, 
and they are provided with an ideological defence when they do not respond, 
for example, to a moral imperative to sell life-saving drugs to dying people at 
affordable prices.  
Conclusions 
The damage caused to developing countries by intellectual property rights, 
and the TRIPS agreement are well documented3. The connection with tax 
competition is less well known. As outlined above, tax competition among 
developed countries with high costs, predominantly in the North, has led to a 
particular tax structure combining low rates, R&D credits, patent income 
exemptions and tax treaties. This aims to achieve a situation where the R&D 
facilities of multinationals are located in the North, long after the 
manufacturing plants have moved to low-cost countries in the South.  
 
The tax structure presents a triple hazard to the developing country hosting 
the manufacturing plant. First, there is a massive incentive to ensure that 
royalty payments  are set at as high a level as possible, to maximise the 
amount of profit that can be channelled through the royalty pipeline. Secondly, 
under the OECD model tax treaty, the developing country will be starved of 
                                            
3 See Oxfam (2001) for a good discussion on how intellectual property rights adversely impact 
on developing countries.  
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corporation tax from the manufacturing plant, as its profits are reduced by the 
royalty payments. Finally, because of the status given to intellectual property, 
it will be difficult if not impossible for lobbyists in the developing country to 
argue against the scale of royalty payment. The old arguments on incentives 
to innovate, and property rights make royalties far more defensible for 
multinational firms than other forms of transfer pricing.  
 
For countries in the North, such as Ireland, as long as they achieve success 
at the new round of tax competition, there will continue to be widespread 
employment, political success for the current government, net immigration 
and in the short term, economic growth. The costs, as set out in Killian (2006) 
centre around making the tax system more regressive through heavier 
dependence on labour or sales taxes, damage or neglect of indigenous 
industry, and the need to tailor non-tax to the needs of multinationals. Tax 
incentives alone will not trigger the location of R&D facilities, as shown by 
studies such as Mansfield (1986). In Ireland, most aspects of government 
policy are now co-ordinated to cater for the multinationals. Already the effort 
to attract R&D facilities has moved beyond tax, to target the education 
system. In 2004, a steering group appointed by the government Department 
of Enterprise, Trade and Employment produced a report entitled “Building 
Ireland’s Knowledge Economy” setting out the steps to be taken to boost 
investment in R&D with a view to securing economic growth. At university 
level, it recommends, inter alia: 
 
The commercialisation of research and knowledge for Ireland’s 
economic benefits through effective intellectual property management 
and technology transfer needs to be a priority in all higher education 
and public research institutes (Forfás 2004:29). 
 
At second level it is recommended to increase spending on science and 
maths, with an inevitable withdrawal of resources from arts and business. This 
strategy is now accepted by all political parties in Ireland4  Worryingly, unlike 
                                            
4 See, for example, Enright (2006) for an articulation of the main opposition party’s plans to 
accentuate science for second level learners 
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countries such as South Africa, entrepreneurship is not taught at primary 
level. Basic business skills are not incentivised in the same way as science. 
The education system is aiming to produce scientists for the multinational 
firms, rather than business-starters and entrepreneurs. Ireland’s economic 
future is hitched, precariously, to multinational firms.  
 
Ultimately, the new round of tax competition is no more sustainable than the 
old. When manufacturing jobs move to low-cost economies, they bring with 
them fuller employment, which has a knock-on effect on the education 
systems in these developing countries. As these countries move through the 
phase of attracting manufacturing jobs with low costs, to developing a highly 
skilled workforce, Ireland will no longer enjoy an advantage in this area. The 
only winners are the multinational firms, who will have a choice of locations 
with well-trained employees, low costs, and minimal taxes.  
 
There are clearly lessons for developing countries to learn from Ireland’s 
experiences.  Most importantly, the tax system should not be tailored for the 
needs of fickle multinational firms at the expense of indigenous 
entrepreneurship. Countries recovering from a colonial past which wiped out 
local industries may deal with this as Ireland did, by seeking out large export-
oriented firms to establish in their territory. However, they would be well 
advised to foster small to medium enterprises at the same time, so as to have 
a base to fall back on when multinationals move on.  
 
This is particularly important for regional development. Despite Ireland’s 
booming economy, remote areas such as Donegal on the north west coast 
have been damaged by the process of enticing, and then losing 
manufacturing jobs. Traditionally, this was a fishing community, but these old 
skills were de-prioritised in the wave of new investment. In August 2005, two 
large multinational manufacturing firms announced that they were closing their 
Donegal plants and moving to a low-cost developing country, with a loss of 
over two thousand jobs. The presence of the factories in Donegal had led to 
prosperity, rising property prices and corresponding debt among the young 
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workers. As McKay (2005) reports, with fishing in decline, there is little to fall 
back on when the multinationals decide to leave.  
 
In negotiating terms with multinationals, developing countries should try to 
ensure that at least some of the R&D is done locally, as well as the 
manufacturing. That will not only anchor the investment a little more firmly, but 
it will also prevent the skimming of the tax base through royalty payments. 
Similarly, when negotiating tax treaties, countries with any negotiating power 
should seek to use the UN rather than the OECD model for the article on 
patent royalties.  
 
Finally, all countries, and all actors in civil society should resist the 
privatisation of ideas, the limitations that ownership puts on research, the 
defence of dubious intellectual property rights and the immutability of price on 
products linked to intellectual property. The private appropriation of previously 
public knowledge is an implicit theft from society. The first round of tax 
competition was already harmful; the second round could bring new levels of 
damage, particularly to developing countries.  
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